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Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson have offered sep-
arate but related arguments against the intelligibility 
of the notion that there are alternative conceptual 
frameworks, and of the notion conceptual framework it-
self.1 Rorty concludes his argument with the claim 
that the "notion of alternative conceptual frameworks 
. . . contains the seeds of doubt about the root notion 
of 'conceptual framework', and so of its own de-
struction."1 He bases this conclusion on an earlier 
argument against the Kantian notion of the faculty of 
receptivity: the possibility of alternative conceptual 
frameworks would serve to show that Kantian intuitions 
and faculties are incapable of determining the content 
of experience. Consequently, such postulates are of 
little value as explanatory tools and can safely be 
eliminated. As Rorty puts it: 
There seems no need to postulate an intermediary 
between the physical thrust of the stimulus upon 
the organ and the full-fledged conscious judgment 
that the properly programmed organism forms in 
consequence. Thus there is no need to split the 
organism up into a receptive wax tablet on the 
one hand and an "active" interpreter of what na-
ture has there imprinted on the other.' 
For Davidson, whom Rorty follows closely on this point, 
the notion of a conceptual framework is merely one half 
of a distinction between conceptual scheme (as Davidson 
calls it, following Quine) and empirical content; his 
chief claim is that tfhis distinction, this 
dualism of scheme and content, of organizing sys-
tem and something waiting to be organized, cannot 
be made intelligible and defensible. It is it-
self a dogma of empiricism, the third dogma. The 
third, and perhaps the last, for if we give it up 
, it is not clear that there is anything left to 
call empiricism.* 
In this paper it shall be my aim to spell out and 
defend a version of the doctrine of conceptual frame-
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works and alternative conceptual frameworks which es-
capes Rorty's and Davidson's criticisms. I will also 
attempt to show that Rorty's position at least requires 
the version of conceptual frameworks I wish to intro-
duce and discuss. Rorty, following earlier pragma-
tists,* rebels against the Cartesian and Kantian vocab-
ularies and priorities; Davidson also resists drawing 
the kinds of distinctions Cartesians and Kantians and 
their followers have drawn. I will simply assume that 
these moves are correct; in particular, I will assume 
that any version of the idea of a conceptual scheme 
which requires distinctions between mind and body as 
two separate kinds of "stuff," between the Kantian a 
priori and a posteriori as setting eternal precondi-
tions of knowing, and between analytic and synthetic as 
permanent categories of propositions, has been shown to 
be untenable, must be given up, and good riddance. In 
proceeding I will argue that none of these traditional 
categories are necessary for an intelligible notion of 
alternative conceptual frameworks, and that scientific 
findings can be used in support of the idea of the con-
ceptual scheme I want to defend. 
My argument begins with incommensurability, a no-
tion Rorty has endorsed. The incommensurability thesis 
is among the most controversial of all the notions in-
troduced by recent "historicist" philosophers of sci-
ence. Without using the term incommensurabi1ity, 
N.R. Hanson argued effectively against the standard 
observational-theoretical distinction: 
There is a sense in which seeing is a theory-
laden undertaking. Observation of x is shaped by 
prior knowledge of x. Another influence on ob-
servations rests in the language or notation used 
to express what we know, and without which there 
would be little we could recognize as knowledge.6 
This opened the way for Kuhn's better known discussions 
of "incommensurable ways of seeing the world and of 
practicing science in it" as due to change of meaning 
and reference of crucial terms from one theory to its 
successor or competitor.7 Equivalent remarks can be 
found in Toulmin's and, of course, Feyerabend's writ-
ings from this period.* All these views, and espe-
cially the claim that incommensurable theories can act 
as genuine competitiors, have undergone detailed and 
oftentimes severe criticism, but the incommensurability 
thesis seems to have survived all attempts at refuta-
tion.* As Kuhn recently wrote, "virtually no one has 
fully faced the difficulties that led Feyerabend and me 
to speak of incommensurability."10 These difficulties 
arise out of the historical evidence that at crucial 
junctures fundamentally new sets of interrelated con-
cepts have been introduced. Newton, for instance, in 
his Principia introduced concepts of mass, force, 
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space, time, etc., which had only the most indirect 
counterparts in the Aristotelian tradition which used 
notions like natural versus violent motion, and terres-
trial versus celestial substance, regarded space as 
both finite and having a privileged center, and so on. 
Likewise, the anthropological linguist B. L. Whorf, 
writing earlier than any of the historicists in philo-
sophy of science, concluded from close study of the 
Hopi language that Hopi cosmology--his term was Hopi 
metaphysics—had no exact equivalent to the Western 
conception of time. 1 1 
Davidson, among many others, 1 2 has contended that 
conceptual contrasts of the kind just outlined make the 
pairs involved incomparable, arguing from incomparabil-
ity to conceptual relativism. And this doctrine, he 
concludes, is incoherent. 
The dominant metaphor of conceptual relativism, 
that of differing points of view, seems to betray 
an underlying paradox. Different points of view 
make sense, but only if there is a common coordi-
nate system on which to plot them; yet the exis-
tence of a common system belies the claim of dra-
matic incomparability.11 
This argument only reaches its intended target, how-ever, if incommensurability in fact entails incompara-bility, and a careful reading of Kuhn and Feyerabend reveals that for them this was never the case. In one of Kuhn's more illuminating statements on the subject he wrote: 
Most readers of my text have supposed that when I 
spoke of theories as incommensurable, I meant 
that they could not be compared. But 'incommen-
surability' is a term borrowed from mathematics, 
and there it has no such implication. The hypot-
enuse of an isoceles right triangle is incommen-
surable with its sides, but the two can be com-
pared to any required degree of precision. What 
is lacking is not comparability but a unit of 
length in terms of which both can be measured di-
rectly and exactly. In applying the term 'incom-
mensurability' to theories, I had intended only 
to insist that there was no common language with-
in which both could be fully expressed and which 
could therefore be used in a point-by-point com-
parison between them.1* 
Feyerabend concurs, having more recently remarked with characteristic bluntness that: 
What we 'discovered' and tried to show was that 
scientific discourse which contains detailed and 
highly sophisticated discussions concerning the 
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comparative advantages of paradigms obeys laws 
and standards that have only little to do with 
the naive models philosophers of science have 
designed for the purpose. There is comparison, 
even 'objective' comparison—but it is a much 
more complex and delicate procedure than is as-
sumed by rationalists.18 
In other words, the equation of incommensurability and 
incomparability rests on a confusion of two distinct 
notions: absence of comparability and absence of an 
algorithm for comparison. Kuhn has more recently in-
troduced the notion of local incommensurability which 
he explicates as follows: 
The claim that two theories are incommensurable 
is then the claim that there is no language, neu-
tral or otherwise, into which both theories, 
conceived as sets of sentences, can be translated 
without residue or loss. No more in its meta-
phorical than its literal form does incommensura-
bility imply incomparability, and for much the 
same reason. Most of the terms common to the two 
theories function in the same way in both; their 
meanings, whatever•those may be, are preserved; 
their translation is simply homophonic. Only for 
a small subgroup of (usually interdefined) terms 
and for sentences containing them do problems of 
translatability arise. The claim that two theor-
ies are incommensurable is more modest than many 
of its critics have supposed.** 
This means that the existence of common elements be-
tween theories is not an objection to incommensurabil-
ity; rather, the incommensurable network of concepts is 
localized to a few, albeit important, terms: there is 
much that remained common to the Aristotelians and 
those trying to develop a dynamics to make physical 
sense of the new astronomy, certainly enough to make 
communication between their respective proponents pos-
sible. Davidson's equation of conceptual contrast with 
complete and mutual untranslatability is therefore in-
correct; his fears of conceptual relativism, unfounded. 
Rorty, who as I already noted supports a version of the 
claim that incommensurable pairs of vocabularies or 
forms of discourse at least exist, points this out as 
well. 1 7 He endorses the following: 
By "commensurable" I mean able to be brought un-der a set of rules which will tell us how ration-al agreement can be reached on what would settle the issue on every point where statements seem to conflict. " 
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Conversely, "incommensurability" must mean an inability 
to arrive at such rules. This differs from the more 
familiar semantic thesis developed by Kuhn and 
Feyerabend, just discussed. The two overlap in that 
semantic incommensurability can have as a consequence 
an absence of commensuration in Rorty's rough metho-
dological sense.1' Rorty goes on to argue that episte-
mology (by which he means epistemology traditionally 
conceived of as a search for intellectual foundations) 
presupposes the possibility of ultimate commensuration 
between all forms of discourse. Arguments that all 
forms of discourse either can or should be brought into 
ultimate commensurability are inadequate; consequently, 
epistemology and all its problems ought to be set 
aside. Included under what ought to be set aside is 
the idea of a conceptual framework as a representation 
of the world. 
Now to my mind the notion of incommensurability, 
even in the more modest form described above, fails to 
make sense unless we have some notion of alternative 
conceptual frameworks; otherwise there are no entities 
to predicate incommensurability of. Hence it now be-
comes necessary to show in greater detail how alterna-
tive conceptual frameworks as I conceive of them differ 
from what Rorty and Davidson wish to do away with, and 
how they can be described without resurrecting the en-
tire Cartesian-Kantian baggage I have agreed must be 
jettisoned. 
There are two distinct claims involved in the idea 
of conceptual frameworks I wish to defend. The first 
and deepest claim is to be found not in Kuhn-Feyerabend 
historicism but rather in contemporary neurophysiologi-
cal research. Rorty, in a remark quoted at the outset, 
referred to "properly programmed organisms" as not 
needing an "intermediary" such as a Lockean veil of 
ideas. Strictly speaking, this is entirely correct, 
but it also loads the dice, for shouldn't we ask, What 
is proper programming? I argue that it consists in a 
complex neurophysiological apparatus, and it is this 
"programming" itself which provides our access to the 
world. 
The results of contemporary neurophysiological re-
search can hardly be adequately summarized in a paper 
of this size, and traditional epistemologists are lia-
ble to dismiss them as irrelevant to philosophical con-
cerns. Their relevance to a naturalized epistemology 
in Quine's sense, however, should be clear. 1 0 The neu-
rosciences lend unambiguous support to a distinction 
between the world qua physical environment and the 
world qua experience as a unity ordered via the natural 
functions of our senses and the complex which sorts 
through the surface irritations (as Quine came to call 
them), retaining the relevant and filtering out the ir-
relevant. This level of activity has to do with the 
structure of the complex consisting of the brain, cen-
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tral nervous system, and senses. The structure is a 
result of millions of years of evolutionary adaptation 
to an environment, and places constraints on the range 
of possible "worlds" a species can experience. Neuro-
physiologist Harry Jerison has written: 
The world as we know it ourselves represents the 
human grade of biological intelligence. Differ-
ent worlds are presumably constructed by differ-
ent species. 
. . . The real world we know intuitively is a 
creation of the nervous system, a model of a pos-
sible world which enables the nervous system to 
handle the enormous amount of information it re-
ceives and processes. The 'true' or 'real world' 
is specific to a species and is dependent on how 
the brain of that species works. This is as true 
for our own world—the world as we know it—as it 
is for the world of any species.21 
Experiments with laboratory animals seem to bear out 
the claim that other species experience the physical 
environment differently than we do. Consider frogs. A 
frog's visual apparatus appears designed to respond to 
rapidly moving objects such as insects, but not to sta-
tionary ones. Experimenters at Harvard discovered that 
a captive frog will survive if kept supplied with live 
insects but starve if the insects are first killed: it 
will.starve even if surrounded by dead insects which it 
seems unable to sense. 2 2 Contemporary scientific re-
search, then, sheds new light on philosopher Thomas 
Nagel's musings over the problems involved in imagining 
"what it is like to be a bat," given the equivalent 
differences between the sensory apparatuses of bats and 
humans (although it is far from clear that Nagel's in-
sistance on the irreducibility of the pour-soi gives 
him an argument against physicalism).23 
This may sound suspiciously like a Kantian position 
so far; indeed, the physical environment as I expli-
cated it sounds like Kant's noumenon while the world 
the senses construct sounds like Kant's phenomenon, 
with neurophysiological apparatus substituted for the 
more familiar Kantian categories and intuitions. I 
believe the analogy breaks down under close inspection; 
for the physical environment, unlike Kant's noumenon, 
is not inaccessible to us—quite the contrary, we are 
always in contact with aspects of it, these again being 
the sources of all our sensory stimuli. Different ani-
mal species are always in contact with different as-
pects of the physical environment, in different de-
grees. To say that we have merely "naturalized Kant" 
is therefore too easy a criticism. 
The argument so far supports a kind of biological 
relativity about the way different species will per-
56 
ceive the environment, but nothing said so far gets us 
from this point to an account of incommensurability and 
alternative conceptual frameworks within the human 
sphere. To accomplish this we must develop a second 
claim concerning a further level of activity which 
gives humans particular historical conceptual frame-
works, namely language, which is constituted of both 
syntactic and semantic elements. For Noam Chomsky in 
particular, the human capacity to acquire and use lan-
guage is biologically innate.2* Chomsky goes further 
and argues for the existence of a universal grammar the 
rules of which are also biologically innate and essen-
tial to all human languages. An assessment of this 
particular claim would take us far beyond the scope of 
the present paper; yet I sense that it can be inter-
preted as not conflicting with the possibility of in-
commensurable vocabularies. This interpretation simply 
follows the conventional distinction between syntax and 
semantics. Thus even if Chomsky is right about there 
being a generative grammar this doesn't affect the ar-
guments concerning incommensurability. Unless we go 
much further than Chomsky and postulate a universal 
semantics, the most we can say is the following: The 
capacity to learn and use language as a precondition of 
thought may be biologically inborn, but the semantic 
apparatus attached to a given language is not, so this 
apparatus becomes entirely a product of one's culture 
or special language community, and the possibility of 
conceptual discontinuities between languages is left 
open. 
The foregoing arguments should clear the way for a 
return to the material introduced by Kuhn, Feyerabend, 
Whorf, and others; this material seems to indicate that 
without the notion of alternative language frameworks 
we are simply unable to make sense of the history of 
science and the findings of cultural anthropologists. 
It is worth reiterating an additional time that much 
more has been read into this thesis than is really 
warranted. Contrary to Achinstein, Shapere, Kordig, 
Davidson, and others, it is simply not the case that 
alternative conceptual frameworks have no elements in 
common. Rather, they are like overlapping sets whose 
admittedly most crucial members, comprising what for 
lack of a better term I will call the "metaphysical 
core" of the language, are not shared. That the most 
crucial and controversial members are not shared is, of 
course, what makes comparison of incommensurable vocab-
ularies difficult and requires such human traits as 
patience and good faith on the part of the respective 
proponents trying to communicate across the incommen-
surable divide. Such communication is almost inevita-
bly the result of interpretation, a notion Kuhn has 
recently offered as an advance over Quinean radical 
translation, explicating his view of the matter as 
follows: 
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Quine's "radical translator" is in fact an inter-
preter, and 'Gavagai' exemplifies the unintellig-
ible material he starts from. Observing behavior 
and the circumstances surrounding the production 
of the text, and assuming throughout that good 
sense can be made of apparently linguistic behav-
ior, the interpreter seeks that sense, strives to 
invent hypotheses, like 'Gavagai' means "Lo, a 
rabbit," which make the utterance or inscription 
intelligible. If the interpreter succeeds, what 
he or she has in the first instance done is learn 
a new language, perhaps the language in which 
'gagavai' is a term, or perhaps an earlier ver-
sion of the interpreter's own language, one in 
which still current terms like 'force' and 'mass' 
or 'element' and 'compound' functioned different-
ly." 
Cases of incommensurability obtain in cases where 
translatability fails, for, as Kuhn adds: 
There need be no English description preferen-
tial with the native term 'gavagai*. In learning 
to recognize gavagais, the interpreter may have 
learned to recognize distinguishing features un-
known to English speakers and for which English 
supplies no descriptive terminology . . . . Un-
der those circumstances, 'gavagai' remains an ir-
reducibly native term, not translatable into Eng-
lish. Though English speakers may learn to use 
the term, they speak the native language when 
they do so. Those are the circumstances for 
which I would reserve the term 'incommensurabil-
ity'." 
The difficulty we have all along had in making sense of 
claims such as these arises, I suggest, not from the 
claims themselves but out of certain assumptions built 
into much of both past and contemporary philosophizing, 
assumptions which Rorty unearths and criticizes under 
the name foundationalism and which Bernstein has more 
recently discussed as symptomatic of a "Cartesian 
Anxiety": either we uncover intellectual foundations 
for knowledge and ultimate commensuration for all vo-
cabularies or we are faced with intellectual anarchy.27 
In my view, Rorty is right to hold that all attempts at 
discovering or erecting foundations, whether for knowl-
edge, or morals, have failed and that the whole project 
should be abandoned. Where we part company is with 
Rorty's additional claim that epistemology itself is, 
in effect, also abandoned when we abandon foundational-
ism. To be sure, a certain conception of the aims of 
epistemology that has been very prominent this century 
must be given up if Rorty's arguments are sound. This 
is the Reichenbachian conception of epistemology as 
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"concerned with constructing the context of justifica-
tion" held by empiricists who have wanted to put sci-
ence on a foundation of neutral sense experience.1* 
But why must we conceive of epistemology as necessarily 
foundational? Why, indeed, for there is an alternative 
conception of epistemology readily available, that be-
ing the naturalism inaugurated by Quine in particular. 
Rorty has hesitated, commenting that "if philosophy 
becomes too naturalistic, hard-nosed positive 
disciplines will nudge it aside . . ."" Yes and no. 
Yes, in the sense that, as Quine pointed out almost two 
decades ago, once we naturalize epistemology there is 
no longer a "first philosophy" standing apart from nat-
ural science. No, in the sense that many of the issues 
traditional epistemologists have grappled with have not 
gone away and can be examined anew as scientific pro-
blems, or at the very least, as close cousins to scien-
tific problems. To carry out a program such as this, 
naturalized epistemologists must be willing and able to 
acquire the technical conceptual machinery of such 
sciences as neurophysiology, putting this machinery to 
use in arriving at clearer and better formulations of 
the problems and making them more amenable to scien-
tific attack (as opposed to so-called linguistic 
dissolutions). This, it seems to me, is a much more 
ambitious and challenging view of the epistemological 
enterprise than that which existed before Quine, and it 
is more precise than Rorty's claims for the philosophy 
of the future as a "voice in the conversation of 
mankind." 
To summarize the main arguments of the present 
paper: Rorty and Davidson have tried to dismantle the 
notions of conceptual frameworks and alternative con-
ceptual frameworks. I have responded that the "scheme 
concept" is required to make sense of the history of 
science. It seems to be a necessary condition for the 
existence of incommensurable physical theories. The ' 
existence of alternative ways of experiencing the phys-
ical environment is supported by neurophysiological 
research. Even if the syntactic properties of language 
have a physical basis the semantic ones do not, and 
this opens the way for genuinely alternative ways of 
describing the human world. Both are relevant to a 
naturalized epistemology freed of the need for founda-
tions but still closely connected with the idea of al-
ternative conceptual frameworks. 
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